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Combining competing business models in transforming economies 
ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to respond to recent calls for better understanding the coexistence of multiple 
business models, we develop the concept of ‘multidexterity’— the ability to develop, nurture, and 
execute several distinctive BM strategies simultaneously across different levels and functions of the MNC and its 
host markets. To illustrate this approach, we describe a European healthcare firm entering the 
rapidly transforming economy of China and facing regulatory constraints and ambiguities in the 
application of industry standards. This situation is a generic challenge for MNCs entering rapidly 
transforming economies, which they help in turn to substantially alter and develop. We argue 
multidextrous business models are effective entry strategies for MNCs. They also help resolve 
two conceptual limitations in the BMI literature: (1) the problem of environmental contingencies 
and (2) the interrelatedness of factors at the macro, meso and micro levels. We address these 
problems from a practice approach. We provide some implications for the concept of 
multidexterity and business models, and address managerial challenges and prospects in 
developing multidextrous organizations. 
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Transforming economies pose significant challenges to multinational corporations’ (MNCs) 
business models (e.g., Chan et al., 2016; Sánchez & Ricart, 2010). This is because they are 
characterized by uncertain, highly volatile, and changing institutional frameworks (Peng, Wang, & 
Jiang, 2008). For instance, China is distinguished by weaker regulatory regimes and industry 
standards (Tan, 2009; Tsai & Child, 1997). So, whilst business models contribute to rapid 
internationalization (Dunford, Palmer, & Benveniste, 2010) and local competition in 
transforming economies (Tallman, Luo, & Buckley, 2018), entering those economies incurs 
institutional and market challenges. These fundamentally threaten MNCs’ business model 
viability (Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016b).  
A business model (BM) is defined as a bundle of specific practices, including value 
proposition, creation, delivery, capture and allocation (Tallman et al., 2018: 522; Teece, 2010: 
172), “conducted to satisfy the perceived needs of the market” (Foss & Saebi, 2018: 13). In the 
context of market entry and expansion, a BM contributes to firm performance in the way 
resources and capabilities are configured (Zott & Amit, 2007, 2008). However, previous studies 
suggest that MNCs entering transforming economies should alter their existing BMs (Tallman et 
al., 2018; Teece, 2014), innovate new BMs that better address the changing competitive landscape 
(Chan et al., 2016), or introduce new BMs while simultaneously exploiting existing models 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2016b; Snihur & Tarzijan, 2018). Despite the recognition that firms 
increasingly use multiple BMs (Casadesus-Masanell & Tarziján, 2012), adopt flexible BMs (Mason 
& Mouzas, 2012), and that the challenges of managing multiple BMs (Khanagha, Volberda, & 
Oshri, 2014; Markides, 2013; Smith, Binns, & Tushman, 2010) are discussed, recognizing some of 
the adverse performance effects of adopting multiple BMs simultaneously (Kim & Min, 2015; 




First, the literature is theoretically underdeveloped and provides limited conceptual 
guidance in how to manage multiple BMs simultaneously (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Second, except 
for a few empirical examples (Pati et al., 2018; Snihur & Tarzijan, 2018), the literature is 
inconclusive on how MNCs address this challenge in transforming economies. As recently noted 
by Tallman, Luo and Buckley (2018: 531), “in no case is “one size fits all” a suitable mantra for 
business models across all markets.” Yet, it remains unclear what the impact of “locational 
differences in BM creation” are, as most research to date is largely “pragmatic and acontextual” 
(Tallman et al., 2018: 533). Indeed, contextualizing business model innovation (BMI) in 
transforming economies is not only important for developing context-sensitive theory 
(Plakoyiannaki, Wei, & Prashantham, 2019), but also making such theory relevant for practice. 
Our aim, in this paper, is to address the current weaknesses in BM research by exploring 
how contextual dynamics affect BMI in transforming economies. The literature suggests two 
distinctive ways in which firms may address these challenges. First, in pursuit of global 
integration, firms replicate their existing BMs in host markets but are liable to the different local 
demands and, therefore, respond to the local conditions of the host market through 
experimentation and co-optation of practices developed or used elsewhere (Dunford et al., 2010). 
Second, when firms’ find their existing BMs are threatened in the new context, notably when 
facing complexity in the institutional regime and turbulence in the market, they engage in trial-
and-error and explore alternative BMs (Teece, 2014). To capture these disparate, yet important 
views into a coherent framework, we offer the concept of multidexterity, which recognizes the 
co-existence of multiple BMs. Specifically, multidexterity aims to explain an organization’s 
capability to develop and maintain multiple BMs at the same time in order to address institutional 
and organisational dynamics. 
The concept of multidexterity, while scarcely used in the management literature, involves 




organisational actors and the simultaneous management of competing strategic agendas of 
different stakeholders (Ritter & Geersbro, 2018). Dispersed organisations, such as MNCs, are 
exposed to different stakeholders and different institutional, regulatory regimes and industrial 
standards in different host markets and are expected to manage these challenges locally while 
remaining coherent globally (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). We, therefore, define multidexterity as 
“the ability to develop, nurture, and execute several distinctive BM strategies simultaneously across different levels 
and functions of the MNC and its host markets”. Similar to the dynamic capabilities view (Helfat et al., 
2007), we assume that multidextrous MNCs have an ability to perform multiple practices 
simultaneously in pursuit of realizing an intended or emergent goal in any local market that 
challenges the firm’s global integration agenda.  
To investigate multidexterity, we use an in-depth case study of a European healthcare 
provider who initially failed to implement a global BM in China and subsequently adopted a 
successful multidextrous BMI approach. From our findings we theorise the multidexterity 
concept in transforming economies and discuss theory and practice implications. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Because transforming economies are highly volatile, uncertain and characterized by changing 
institutional frameworks (Peng et al., 2008), the regulatory regime of such countries may offer 
advantages for some and disadvantages for others. Market entry into transforming economies is 
increasingly conditioned by market-based capabilities, that is, specific knowledge about the 
institutional and regulatory regimes of the host country (Peng et al., 2008). Some of the 
conditions underlying local market and institutional regimes may share the same characteristics as 
other countries, allowing transferability or adaptability globally, whereas transforming economies 
place high demands on products and services that need to adhere to local standards, regulatory 
requirements, with locally responsive marketing and distribution systems (Ghoshal & Nohria, 




originating from the home market and the localised BMs (Tallman et al., 2018) such that global 
BMs require adaptation to local needs, or arbitrating disadvantageous home country practices 
with advantageous host market practices (Ghemawat, 2007).  
Indeed, while combining internationalisation strategies have proven effective for some 
MNCs (e.g. GE Healthcare), managing the tensions between the global integration and local 
responsiveness strategies is challenging. Transforming economies in general and China, in 
particular, may be advantageous for some MNC strategies (Luo & Child, 2015), but this does not 
mean that it is unproblematic to find a good fit between the local institutions and entrant firms’ 
practices (Teece, 2019). On the contrary, any combination of BMs in pursuit of balancing global 
integration and local responsiveness is likely to be subject to the dynamism inherent between the 
two (Kumar & Puranam, 2011; Luo & Child, 2015). 
BMI in Transforming Economies 
The uncertain and volatile nature of transforming economies requires localised capabilities to 
adapt BMs (Teece, 2014) and managerial efforts to continuously make BMs more distinctive and 
agile against competition (Doz & Kosonen, 2010). These capabilities are important for MNCs as 
they allow them to recognise differences in the local business environment and reinstate “fitness” 
between the firm’s global BM and the local institutional and regulatory regimes. Indeed, the 
adaptability of global BMs will be contingent on “how fragmented regulations and standards turn 
out to be” (Teece, 2019: 192) and how localised actions underpin the MNC’s host market 
strategy (Teece, 2014). These specific challenges have implications on BM adaptation and 
innovation in such environments where markets are volatile and institutional regimes are subject 
to rapid changes (Tallman et al., 2018; Teece, 2018). 
The MNC’s value creation and value delivery model will face disruptions unless the firm 
substitutes key elements in its BM that reflect changes in its external business environment 




value may migrate and augment the MNC’s global strategy (Ghemawat, 2007) or reinforce its 
localisation strategy (Luo & Child, 2015). However, earlier studies treat the transforming 
economy context as constant and do not provide any clues other than micro-level contingencies. 
Hence, in previous studies the macro-level context is not accounted for, leaving it conceptually 
underdeveloped and empirically limited (Markides, 2013) in the context of transforming 
economies (Luo & Child, 2015). 
Despite the importance of maintaining a fit between BMs and local business environments, 
context-sensitive approaches to BMI, especially in transforming economies, remain scant (Luo & 
Child, 2015; Tallman et al., 2018). For example, prior studies have focused on how multiple BMs 
generate value (e.g., Sánchez & Ricart, 2010) and contribute to MNCs’ performance in 
transforming economies (Kim & Min, 2015), but we know little about how existing BMs are 
coupled with resources in transforming economies, hence disregarding the resource dynamics 
involved in managing multiple BMs. There is a need for research that explores the contextual 
dynamics of BMI in transforming economies and captures the micro details of combining old 
models with new ones in order to reveal new insights.  
Some studies have suggested that MNCs may refine their existing global BMs upon market 
entry rather than localising them. Monaghan and Tippmann (2018) found that some MNCs avoid 
rushing into new markets to be able to adapt their BMs. However, adaptation of BMs is part of 
the global integration process in which new experiences continuously add to the firms’ “recipe 
heuristic” (Monaghan & Tippmann, 2018). Other studies have suggested different states of BMI. 
For example, Khanagha et al. (2014: 324), take an evolutionary view, including “incremental 
changes in individual components of business models, extension of the existing business model, 
introduction of parallel business models, [and] disruption of the business model, which may 
potentially entail replacing the existing model with a fundamentally different one.” Such 




incremental process towards local adaptation but ignore the effects of external contingencies that 
require more radical shifts in the MNCs BMs. 
These specific contingencies not only have implications on the MNC’s local organisational 
structure, processes and the power regime (Begley & Boyd, 2003; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993), but 
also on the ability to adapt the BM to fit with the MNC’s global BM. As Tallman et al. (2018) 
note, transforming economies spur bottom-up developments of new BMs that oppose the 
traditional top-down approach practiced by many MNCs (Birkinshaw et al., 2016a). This indicates 
that transforming economies require a close interaction between localised BMs and the 
orchestration of the MNC’s “subsystems and processes to accomplish a specific purpose” 
(George & Bock, 2011: 97). However, transforming economies add to the complexity of 
orchestrating actors along a vertical value chain that is not under the direct ownership or 
bureaucratic control of the focal firm (Zeng, Simpson, & Dang, 2017). 
While this recursive process between BMI and organizational design seems intuitive, Foss 
and Saebi (2017: 214) found that this relationship is scarcely studied and that “more research is 
required to understand the organizational design aspects of BMI”, where BMI is defined as 
“nontrivial changes to the key elements of a firm’s BM and/or the architecture linking these 
elements” (Foss & Saebi, 2017: 216). This definition suggests that BMI is an evolutionary process 
(Khanagha et al., 2014; Monaghan & Tippmann, 2018), led by key decision-makers in pursuit of 
making changes to the ordinary, yet not stabilised BM.  
In sum, with some general exceptions (Casadesus‐Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Markides & 
Oyon, 2010; Smith et al., 2010), it remains largely unclear how MNCs can strike a balance 
between the original BM designed to address global integration while at the same time innovating 
BMs for local responsiveness (Snihur & Tarzijan, 2018). Part of this complexity lies in 
implementing integrative yet different BMs in several geographically dispersed sites while trying 




(Teece, 2018). This may be due to obstacles in transforming economies associated with the; (i) 
internal fit between diverse BMs, (ii) external fit with localized foreign markets, and (iii) dynamic 
interaction between internal and external cultural, institutional and socio-economic factors 
(Tallman et al., 2018). While previous studies provide some clues for how to alter the value 
generating and capture mechanisms in BMs in response to these factors, empirical accounts of 
the use and development of multiple BMs in transforming economies remains scant. 
Multidexterity 
In addressing these limitations of multiple BMs in transforming economies, we introduce a novel 
concept—multidexterity. The root form—dexterity—is associated with readiness or skilfulness 
and has been used to denote start-up firms’ skilfulness in executing individual organising 
processes in response to international market entry uncertainties (Autio, George, & Alexy, 2011). 
While dexterity denotes deliberate and focused enactment of specific organisational capabilities at 
the expense of others, multidexterity denotes an ability to simultaneously orchestrate strategic 
actions within and outside the firm at multiple levels. Multidextrous organisations are further 
capable of balancing the inherent relationship between selection and evaluation practices. The 
former denotes the ability to enact multiple selection regimes, where some of which are not 
necessarily aligned, legitimated or resourced by the existing strategic context of the organisation 
(Burgelman, 1983). The multiplicity of selection regimes is dependent on the performance 
measurement practices as any choice will be subjected to scrutiny and evaluation, both internally 
and externally (Adner & Levinthal, 2008). This suggests that multidexterity implies an ability to 
balance the conditions emerging in one domain with those of another domain. Multidexterity, 
therefore, is geared towards achieving “different and multiple objectives” (Ritter & Geersbro, 
2018: 75) at once.  
As such, multidexterity is a bundle of practices (Schatzki, 2016) that intersect variably into 




performing, experiencing and evaluating activities within and outside organisational boundaries. 
In the case of MNCs, this implies an ability to balance the unique requirements of local markets 
that differ both from the global BM and unique local BM of other specific markets. For example, 
an actor in a supply chain may enact the same BM as another but handles industry standards with 
different level of skilfulness and may enact a different response strategy to local institutional 
norms and legal regulations than those of another market (Oliver, 1991).  
Multidexterity is particularly promising for understanding how MNCs orchestrate the 
multiple and conflicting demands of different stakeholders, institutional and regulatory regimes, 
industrial standards, resources, value creation and appropriation regimes. For example, while the 
use of multiple BMs is essentially a response to problems of technological discontinuities (Ettlie, 
Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984), autonomous middle managers (Burgelman, 1983) and frontline 
managers (Birkinshaw et al., 2016a), prior analytical models have not adequately captured how 
MNCs simultaneously orchestrate various resource dynamics in global and local BMs. For 
example, when BMs are exposed to international markets, value creation and value delivery 
activities may not only face a certain degree of disintegration, they may also undermine each 
other (Tallman et al., 2018). Hence, “how to obtain resource commitments for initiatives that 
appear foreign and at odds with existing BMs” (Adner & Levinthal, 2008: 49) remains unclear. 
The concept of multidexterity, we argue, is particularly suited for this task as it helps 
distinguishing BMI on two dimensions i) coupling and ii) coherence. By coupling, we mean the 
extent to which BMs within the same system have interdependent variables (Weick, 1976: 3) and 
share specific qualities depending on the contextual dynamics of the system. For example, 
multiple BMs may converge around strong couplings in asset use practices and in market barrier 
management (Casadesus-Masanell & Tarziján, 2012) and have loose couplings around service 
contracts and joint product development partnerships (Sabatier, Mangematin, & Rousselle, 2010). 




coherent. We take coherence to mean the extent to which a BM is responsive to the larger value-
creating ecosystem (Massa, Tucci, & Afuah, 2017), demonstrated by consistency relative to the 
activities constituting the system. For instance, a BM may have a distinctive supply infrastructure 
from another and will, in that practice site, be non-coupled with other BMs. But the same BM 
may have an undistinctive demand infrastructure, sharing the same customer base of another BM 
and may, in that practice site, be coupled with other BMs simultaneously managed by the MNC. 
Based on these initial arguments, the concept of multidexterity offers a promising view of 
MNCs operating in complex transforming economies. We argue that while MNCs can be 
competitive by arbitrating between the disadvantages of different markets, multidextrous MNCs 
can embrace the complexity and ambiguity inherent in and around different practices. 
Multidexterity accepts deviations from ordinary organizational practices as natural selection and 
adaptation processes (Anderson, 1999) across multiple organisational sites (Schatzki, 2016). 
Building from these theoretical arguments, we use the concept of multidexterity to explain how 
multiple and seemingly contradictory BMs can be enacted in transforming economies. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS 
Studying multidexterity in pursuit of BMI is contextually sensitive (Plakoyiannaki et al., 2019) and 
particularly suitable for MNCs operating in transforming economies (Tallman et al., 2018). Our 
study concerns an international healthcare service provider, OneHealth (pseudonym), that has 
pursued a rapid multinationalisation strategy (Monaghan & Tippmann, 2018), growing from 150 
to 360 clinics (3,000 to 11,000 employees) across 19 countries including transforming economies 
such as Brazil, Chile, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Because these countries have different 
regulatory frameworks, OneHealth has enacted a limitedly flexible global BM. This included a 
mix of freestanding clinics, management contracts with hospitals, and public-private partnerships 
in which OneHealth manages and operates clinics on long-term contracts on behalf of regional 




Over the past few years, the newly formed Middle East & Asia (MEA) region has become 
the company’s real growth engine with Saudi Arabia having developed into the biggest market 
globally with 35 clinics and 1,300 employees. While OneHealth’s strategic target for Saudi Arabia 
is continued growth, it predicts to become even bigger in China over the coming 5-7 years, 
aspiring to become a top-3 player. To reach such a position, they “need to operate some 75-100 
mid-sized clinics” as noted by the senior vice president for MEA (“SVP”). This would be a very 
challenging task for the global BM as OneHealth is contracted by the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
in Saudi Arabia whilst in China each opportunity “has to be sourced and developed from scratch 
in the open competitive market” (SVP). This challenge to the global BM is the research focus. 
Research Design 
Given the emerging nature of BMI in transforming economies we used a longitudinal, multi-
source data collection research design (Yin, 2009) to better capture strategy-performance 
relationships (Junni et al., 2013). Similar to prior studies and recommendations (Heracleous, 
Gößwein, & Beaudette, 2018; von Krogh, Rossi-Lamastra, & Haefliger, 2012), we inquired into 
this phenomenon in an early, embryonic stage, focusing on providing empirical and theoretical 
insights. OneHealth is a noteworthy and appropriate case for our investigation as it is an 
exemplar (Yin, 2009) of multidextrous BMI in a transforming economy, and so provides insight 
to the challenges posed to MNCs’ global BMs. This case was therefore based on theoretical 
sampling (Yin, 2009) allowing us to explore valuable insights at this early stage of the 
phenomenon (von Krogh et al., 2012). 
We focused our data collection on extensive secondary data and in-depth primary interview 
and observational data generated from well-informed actors. We collected data from the 
LexisNexis database (December 2007 – February 2019), which yielded 700+ unique articles, and 
collected all available financial reports, press releases and blog posts (approx. 150, May 2011 – 




presentations, BM configurations, strategic decisions, etc. These sources were used to identify the 
different market entry strategies and changes to the BM. 
Starting in late 2017, the first author initiated a series of semi-structured interviews and 
discussions (n=10) with a key informant (Yin, 2009), focusing on multidextrous BMI practice. 
Our informant (SVP) is a key decision maker who has “extensive and exclusive information and 
the ability to influence important firm outcomes, either alone or jointly with others (e.g., on a 
board of directors)” (Aguinis & Solarino, 2019: 3). Hence, sampling this key informant implied 
access to highly reliable and deep knowledge (Miles & Huberman, 1994) of multidextrous BMI 
activities. Similar to other scholars, we chose the SVP as he was personally responsible for the 
market entry (Bingham & Davis, 2012) and personally involved in BMI (Berends et al., 2016), 
which is typical to autonomous strategic actions by executives (Burgelman, 1983). 
 Interviews and discussions lasted between 30 and 90 minutes with shorter exploratory, 
non-directive interviews at the beginning, to establish trust and interest, longer more detailed 
ones later, and short gap filling ones at the end. Questions revolved around the company’s 
history, expansion paths, learning experiences, and failures, responses, as well as adjustments to 
the global BM and the details around the introduction of the new BMs. Using such directive and 
non-directive techniques helped us mitigate informant bias (Huber & Power, 1985; Miller, 
Cardinal, & Glick, 1997) and build a strong ground for theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In early 2018, we complemented these in-depth interviews with an observational study of a 
one-day open strategy workshop (Hautz, Seidl, & Whittington, 2017) in order to (1) corroborate 
the views of the key informant and (2) gather information on the evolution of the new BMs in 
vivo. Our key informant presented his case on “How to enter the Chinese market” for informed 
insights from 12 non-competitor executives of Western MNCs in China. The workshop resulted 
in excess of 300 pages of notes and photos. In adopting this approach, our goal was to identify 




conflicts between structures and individual actions can be accommodated within the same 
explanatory frame (Sewell, 1992) and hence resonates well with a multidextrous approach.  
Data Analysis 
Because multidextrous BMI is poorly theorized, we took an “abductive” process approach aiming 
to offer a plausible explanation to a theoretically incomplete “anomaly” (Van de Ven, 2007; 
Weick, 1989). This can help connect empirical observations “to extant theoretical ideas to 
generate novel conceptual insight and distinctions” (Langley et al., 2013: 11) by recurrently 
examining alternative explanations. Abduction is, therefore, particularly suited to resolve “the 
status quo explanation of a given phenomenon” (Van de Ven, 2007: 65), that strategies of global 
integration and local responsiveness can coexist through multiple BMs. Accordingly, we analysed 
our data in several iterative steps, aspiring to find the most plausible explanation to the practices 
underpinning multidextrous BMI. However, for the sake of simplicity, we present our approach 
sequentially. 
First and consistent with single case methods (Siggelkow, 2007), we began our analysis 
while collecting data by reading our transcripts, notes, and other materials and condensing the 
data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We wrote short narratives about the evolutionary steps in 
OneHealth’s BMs during its multinationalisation. Throughout the entire process, we discussed 
potential discrepancies in our narratives and alternative plausible explanations to multidextrous 
BMI and, when necessary, refined the narratives by returning to our data. Once the whole period 
was covered, we decomposed critical descriptive events and strategies into temporal brackets 
aiming to capture disruptions to the global BM, innovations, practices and the drivers of BM 
disruptions (see table 1).  
<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
This initial analysis revealed that the global BM was complemented by several local BMIs 




both regulatory regimes and by conflicting industrial standards facing OneHealth during market 
entry into transforming economies. The institutional regulatory regimes could determine the “life 
and death of the business”, or the extent to which the global BM supports or threatens the 
survival of the firm in the local market (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014; Tallman et al., 2018). The 
industrial standards for medical services are instrumental for the healthcare industry’s 
technological environment and constitute the firms’ BM competitiveness (Casadesus‐Masanell & 
Zhu, 2013; Volberda, Van den Bosch, & Heij, 2017). Hence, these two dimensions emerged as 
our main analytical springboards for better understanding multidextrous BMI in transforming 
economies. 
In a second step, we triangulated the different data sources to derive empirically viable 
evidence to illustrate relationships between these environmental and technological conditions 
emerging from transforming economies and the actions taken for strategic change and fitness 
(Helfat et al., 2007). We discovered that different localized BMI were variably related to the 
regulatory regimes and the industrial standards of each market, revealing various degrees of 
coupling and coherence between local BMs and the global BM. Using this distinction, we 
discovered four types of BMIs which, following axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and 
examining different theories to find plausible explanations for each, labelled as; resource 
integration, skunkworks, resource partitioning, resource orchestration (see figure 1). 
<< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
In order to substantiate our analyses, we distinguished empirical examples of multidexterity 
and used these to develop short narratives explaining how these relationships capture each of the 
elements for multidextrous BMI. We circulated these narratives to our key informant and the 
open strategy participants for so called “member checks” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 314). These 
did not fundamentally challenge our model; they helped us refine it and increase its credibility and 




bundles (Demir, 2015) as their viability as BMs was dependent on whether they were coherent 
and how they were coupled with each other. This helped us to uncover multidextrous BMI 
practices (see marked area in figure 1). 
FINDINGS 
Our data suggests that multidextrous BMI takes place when the regulatory and industrial 
standards of the transforming economy challenge the MNC’s global BM. The global BM largely 
builds on three critical elements: i) ownership of, or control over, resources; ii) European 
industrial standards and iii) deregulated and unambiguous market for healthcare provision. These 
factors can undermine the MNE’s go-to market strategy and its ability to generate value in local 
contexts due to their local variations. Therefore, developing alternative BMs that are either 
adaptations of the global BM or entirely new BMs is of central importance in highly uncertain 
and volatile local markets. We find that, to respond to such uncertainties, local subsidiaries 
challenge the conditions underlying the global BM of the MNC.  
We found that, whilst OneHealth experienced significant success in entering highly 
regulated markets with unambiguous industry standards with their global BM, such as Saudi 
Arabia, they experienced failures when attempting to enter Turkey and in their first attempt to 
enter China. In Turkey the market was highly deregulated with decentralized business licensing 
and “basically no medical standards”, meaning there was “too much volatility”; “doctors could 
attract patients from our clinics simply by offering them direct and indirect cash incentives” 
(SVP). Incapable of accommodating these significantly different local practices into the global 
BM, OneHealth divested its clinics in Turkey. They then tried to enter the Chinese renal care 
market with a joint venture in order to replicate their global BM logic. Again, there were 
ambiguous industry standards and the global BM was not effective as there were no private clinic 
chains for platform acquisitions available; foreign firms had restricted entry requirements; and 




clinic business. The importance of the Chinese market meant that OneHealth management 
decided to “realize the international high growth plan by any means possible” (SVP). Because 
“business model innovation is highly decentralized” (SVP), the SVP developed three alternative 
BMs, each with a specific characteristic common to the global BM but also with distinctive 
features inimical to the global BM.  
These different BMs reveal several distinctive multidextrous BMI practices that are 
illuminated using two key organisational dimensions of multidexterity; i) coupling and ii) 
coherence. These two dimensions result in a typology that identifies four distinct multidextrous 
types: i) “resource integration”;  tight coupling of resources and strong coherence with corporate 
policies and procedures, ii)  “skunkworks” (Burgelman, 1983); practices which involve activities 
that are loosely coupled from the organization and not necessarily sanctioned by top management 
(Adner & Levinthal, 2008), iii) “resource partitioning” (Carroll, Dobrev, & Swaminathan, 2002); 
practices directed to partition a resource space into favourable parts vis-à-vis rivals, iv) “resource 
orchestration” (Sirmon et al., 2011); practices involving the arrangement and coordination of 
resources to gain advantages in the local marketplace. This may include structuring, bundling, 
integrating and leveraging for competitive advantage (Helfat & Martin, 2015). Together, these 
multidextrous BMIs show how the MNC responded to local needs and constraints by managing 
their level of coupling and coherence with the global BM (see table 2).  
<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
Resource Integration (Quadrant 1)—The Global BM  
A significant reason for OneHealth’s international high-growth was the use of BM replication 
(Dunford et al., 2010) or “recipe heuristic” (Monaghan & Tippmann, 2018). OneHealth’s global 
BM was based on resource integration. OneHealth’s expansion into Saudi Arabia’s highly 
regulated transforming economy showed its global BM was only marginally adapted to the local 




tightly couple its resources with the rest of the organization. This further helped create a strong 
coherence between the local adaptations of the global BM. Our analysis revealed three 
underpinning practices; resource ownership, service integration, and technological nesting. 
Resource ownership. Resource ownership allowed the MNC to be highly distributed and 
complex and yet able to control the stock of resources without assuring the standards required 
for resource quality, immobility of private information, availability during times of high growth, 
market uncertainty and supply chain volatility. Although OneHealth’s global BM was configured 
for a centralized model of market regulation and had limited ability to deal with variations across 
local host markets, resource ownership ensured controlled high growth in highly regulated 
markets. OneHealth designed its global BM to assure consistency and control across its global 
network of clinics by employing a full ownership strategy that allowed minority shareholder 
partners only as a transition strategy to overcome local regulatory liabilities. Resources such as 
machinery and clinics were either under the direct ownership of OneHealth or secured through 
long term contracts with hospitals or health authorities. 
Centralized regulation enabled speedy market entry as it afforded a “one-stop-shop” logic 
where OneHealth was negotiating licences, terms of operation and clinic ownership with only 
one contractual partner (e.g. Ministry of Health, “MoH”). In dealing with only one governing 
body, OneHealth could gradually build trust and commitment vis-à-vis local authorities helping 
them to negotiate favourable conditions, thus mitigating market uncertainties. It also allowed 
quicker ramp up so that OneHealth’s initial joint venture to run one single clinic became a five-
year contract to run 50 percent of clinics managed by the MoH in just two years. 
Resource ownership further helped OneHealth to rapidly and tightly couple local 
operations with the overall structure of the group allowing them to “integrate clinics through a 
100-day and 1-year integration plan.” It also helped control medical quality standards: “Quarterly 




newly acquired clinic has been integrated [and] the longer a clinic has been with OneHealth, the 
better the medical performance” (CMO). Central regulatory regimes also favoured OneHealth’s 
ownership strategy as senior management were physically located “close to clinic operations” 
(CEO), allowing them to have full access to patients, staff and referring medical team members 
(employed by hospitals). Hence, resource ownership was key to altering OneHealth’s local 
responsiveness in highly regulated markets and allowed senior managers to “have an intimate 
understanding of customer needs and thus enable(ing) us to act quickly and decisively” (CEO) to 
local needs, but also to constantly refine the global BM based on patient feedback on 
OneHealth’s “standard of quality” (CEO). 
Service integration. In medical care delivery, the quality of service requires compliance with 
regulatory frameworks, industry standards, and organisation specific systems, practices and 
processes. The latter also warrants some degree of efficiency in service delivery and hence can 
serve as a value capture mechanism. However, private clinics compete on several dimensions, 
such as delivery of high-quality service to patients (family members are normally involved in 
clinic selection), retention and endorsement of clinics. Our analysis revealed that almost 50% of 
OneHealth’s total new patient base were referrals from existing patients and their families. 
Medical clinics further compete through the establishment of close trusting relationships with 
hospital physicians and nurses to become the alternative referral choice for patients that are 
dissatisfied with the service or medical quality of the existing clinic.  
Our analysis revealed two integrated service practices; (1) integrated patient care, and (2) 
patient empowerment. Integrated patient care is the practice of coordinating the patient’s entire 
healthcare needs, including medical care, preventive care, management and treatment of kidney 
disease, and individualised patient care advise. These are monitored through patient satisfaction 
surveys twice a year at each clinic throughout the world and the results directly alter the global 




made monthly for newly started (or acquired) clinics and as improvement is achieved, surveys are 
made on a quarterly basis until they reach the threshold level (90%). Further, because industry 
standards vary across markets, with some markets having more ambiguous standards than others, 
OneHealth takes advantage of their integrated value creation practice of medical care, “In new 
markets, the policies and procedures are rolled out in close cooperation with the local teams… 
benefitting from the international experience of OneHealth.” (Annual Review, 2016). While 
medical care services are initially locally responsive, they are designed to continuously migrate 
towards global standards. As the CEO noted, “we were delighted to see the progress of the 
integration process [in Saudi Arabia] to achieve OneHealth care standards.” 
Patient empowerment practice has the same integrational structure as the renal care 
practice; it is designed to continuously migrate from local responsiveness to global integration. 
Patient empowerment is devised to make local industrial standards a baseline criterion to be 
coupled with internal standards rather than aspirational criteria beyond OneHealth’s internal 
standards. This involves educating patients to enable them “to better understand their disease and 
be empowered to take action to improve the quality of their lives” (Annual Review 2016). 
Despite some initial challenges in Saudi Arabia, patient empowerment was set to align with global 
standards. For example, to strengthen patient empowerment, OneHealth structurally integrated 
its Scientific Department with ‘Medicate’, “an umbrella for all education programs for nurses, 
doctors, patients, managers, etc.” (SVP).   
Technological nesting. Given the ambiguity of local standards of medical treatment and the 
variation of industrial regulation across the globe, responding to local requirements for medical 
practice license approval is heavily dependent on coherence between local and global practice. 
This was achieved through technological nesting where localized variations in clinic management 
are gradually coupled and made coherent with a globalized standard. At OneHealth, technology 




way with high quality.” (SVP). This is particularly important for high reliability organizations 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). For instance, “Would we perform serious medical errors… 
that would be a serious issue… globally” (SVP).  Technological nesting was, therefore, contingent 
on internal coupling of systems, practices and processes as well as coherence with regulations and 
medical standards.  
Our analysis shows that technological nesting underpinned the global BM in two respects: 
value proposition performance and medical treatment capability. For value performance, new 
clinics were surveyed on patient satisfaction and medical quality for every single treatment and 
this was compared across OneHealth’s global clinic network. “Everything is facts based… We 
have statistics for fifteen years back, on every country” (SVP). In this way, technological nesting 
provides a dynamic performance mechanism that allows the organization to constantly track 
performance gaps and failures locally and globally while at the same time indicating areas of 
improvement. It also convinces local authorities of medical treatment capabilities and 
effectiveness. In addition, technology nesting is also a source of competitive advantage: “public 
hospitals and clinics can’t afford systems like this… you can’t achieve the same degree of 
benchmark as we have with 360 interconnected clinics. If you can’t follow up on performance, 
it’ll be difficult to improve” (SVP).  
The practices of resource ownership, services integration and technological nesting show 
how resource integration is underpinned by tight coupling and strong coherence between the 
global BM and local BM (Tallman et al., 2018). Our findings add a contextual contingency to this 
view suggesting that with “resource integration” BMs will remain unchallenged where markets 
are characterised by unambiguous standards, so MNCs are unlikely to be inclined to engage in 
BMI. This leads to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: When transforming economies are characterized by low ambiguity in 
regulatory and industrial standards, MNCs are likely to use resources that are tightly coupled 




Skunkworks (Quadrant 2) 
With the increasing pressure from the owners and the board to close the gap in China by 
“significantly increasing the chances of success…as soon as possible” (SVP), there were few 
options at hand. Clinic license regulations and application procedures were lengthy, complex, and 
incurred high risk. Both OneHealth and other international competitors had struggled to set up 
their own clinics. Moreover, there were almost no prospects to make a platform acquisition that 
would breakeven quickly enough. In fact, the initial failures in China had pushed the OneHealth 
board and owners to become even more restrictive with respect to their ownership regime as 
they “could not afford losing this battle as both of its global competitors had recently made 
serious attempts to set up clinics in the Mainland [China]” (SVP). Effectively this constrained 
entrepreneurial initiatives and local operations using the global BM. 
To compensate, the SVP resorted to skunkworks which are autonomous practices that 
challenge the structural context of the organization (Burgelman, 1983) and loosen the selection 
and validation regimes of the current strategy (Adner & Levinthal, 2008). SVP used his autonomy 
to work on initiatives without having them prematurely evaluated by top management. This 
enabled him to introduce a localised BM that was loosely coupled with the global BM and was 
largely incoherent with its value capture principles. 
More specifically, skunkworks resulted in the acquisition of a product distributor. Whilst 
local BM adaptations of the group’s medical standards only allowed for marginal adjustments, the 
product distribution acquisition helped develop “an unorthodox business model” (SVP) and a 
new performance metric that did not exist in other parts of the MNC network. Essentially, it 
would help “quickly reach a break-even situation in China and expand the target’s existing 
product distribution… to generate cash in China for investing in China” (SVP). It was exactly 
this decoupled performance objective that merited the new BMI as a viable option. To pursue 




integration was reconsidered by disintegrating parts of the practices and processes and replacing 
them by other parts. Second, it decoupled the ownership regime of the global BM.  
Disintegrating service integration. The main difficulties for OneHealth in the Chinese market 
were a complex network of layered local distributors, resulting in higher end-user prices than 
international markets, large international competitors that were both product and service 
providers (although due to complex regulations, they couldn’t offer both) and a few local Chinese 
competitors that ran both clinics and offered the technology, which gave them the advantage of a 
more “seamless” value proposition. In acquiring the distributor, SVP sought to launch a double-
sided BM. The first side of the BM was designed to providing hospitals with treatment machines 
and other equipment “for free” or at a relatively low cost, hence generating value to customers by 
minimizing their capital expenses. In return, the distribution business captures value from 
consumables sales. The other side of the BM is a so-called Price Per Treatment (PPT) model. 
The model, which was later named “PPT+” is largely a sourcing model offered to hospitals and 
includes machines, consumables and other products to the actual treatment (not the medical 
diagnosis). This includes the provision of some basic training to patients and medical staff as well 
as offering management of clinics. The SVP found the PPT model as a viable solution as, “the 
people who run these [distributors] have often built this business for a very long time and, have 
very strong contacts with the hospitals, staff, and local authorities”. Despite the lack of coherence 
with OneHealth’s global BM, especially with respect to its service regime, the PPT was designed 
to mitigate local constraints. 
The PPT model also addressed a competitive challenge from international rivals—it was 
not bound to a single machine manufacturer, “even if this is more of a product business, they are 
neither bound to delivering products from one supplier [which is usually the case] nor inhibited 
by local regulations” (SVP). The product distribution offering would, however, have to be loosely 




established systems, practices and processes to accommodate for product distribution business at 
the corporate level: “Our hypothesis regarding this model [PPT] is to do a quite light integration 
to start with, as it is a somewhat different business, and we don’t want to overload it with 
overhead costs.” (SVP) Hence, given the specific design of the PPT-based BM, there was little 
coherence with OneHealth’s service integration logic. 
Decoupling ownership. Arbitrating the global BM with a localised BM, was a high-risk 
endeavour, at least initially, as the skunkworks had some dependency on the resources, processes, 
practices, and technologies underpinning the global BM. Acquisitions were normally of 
established clinics which had already passed internal project validation and selection regime 
controlled by global BM ownership policies. Skunkworks decoupled this ownership regime by 
keeping the new BM secret. As one workshop participant advised, “I think you should work your 
way through the market in secrecy… Do not speak so much about how you go about. Save it till 
later. Tell it along the way, till you get the licenses and work your way into the market.” Because 
hard proof of the viability of the PPT model was missing, the SVP continued “underground” 
until he had secured the conditions for acquiring the local Chinese distributor. 
The global BM required full ownership of local businesses but instead, SVP liaised with 
lawyers to acquire the distributor using a local partner. Although the local partner was indirectly a 
shareholder in OneHealth, the legal setup circumvented the internal ownership policy. While the 
acquisition fully complied with Chinese foreign ownership regulations, it was unconventional for 
OneHealth’s board and owners as it was a decoupling of the global BM ownership policy. Setting 
up a JV with a remote partner was unconventional especially as the new (quasi) wholly-owned 
venture had built a BM based on (1) agreements with a hospital in south China to operate its new 
built clinic as a management contract, (2) acquired two different private actors running 
independent clinics, and (3) an additional acquisition of another medical products distributor to 




participants on the long-term viability of this model, SVP argued that “Although indirectly, this 
model can be regarded as a wholly owned OneHealth business and, surely, we will always be 
treated as a foreign investor in China,  we have freed ourselves from the uncertainty of having a 
Chinese minority owner.”  
The PPT model responded to the local conditions with the lengthy or “prohibitively long 
licensing procedures” by being “an effective way to buy some time for success to happen in 
China” (SVP). The model further helped address the financial pressures exerted from 
headquarters with the distribution business yielding financial breakeven less than six months after 
the acquisition. In this respect, a skunkworks BM was a crucial means to achieve local 
responsiveness despite conflicting with validated performance measures in the global BM. 
The BMI literature has largely ignored skunkworks, focusing more on adaptations of 
structure, scale and scope of organisations (Fjeldstad & Snow, 2018) but our findings show that 
skunkworks can expand beyond both resource and structural boundaries of an MNC. 
Skunkworks are likely to emerge as distinctive practices in an MNC’s multidextrous activities 
when the firm’s global BM is challenged in transforming markets that are characterised by high 
entry barriers, low degrees of private investment, poor evidence of institutional learning and 
decentralized regulatory bodies. Where managers can disentangle themselves from formal 
organisational structures by taking advantage of resources that are loosely coupled with the 
organization’s core business and are marginally coherent with existing resources in the local 
environment, there will be opportunities for BMI skunkworks in order to be locally responsive. 
This leads us to our second proposition: 
Proposition 2: When transforming economies are characterized by high regulatory ambiguity and 
industrial standards that are inimical with MNCs’ global BMs, new BMs will be developed through 




Resource Partitioning (Quadrant 3) 
Competition in the Chinese healthcare industry is focused to larger cities and provinces and 
mainly based on the size of the clinic base. Medical care resources are, therefore, highly 
concentrated in large more medically sophisticated public hospitals (L3): “Dialysis is currently 
mostly done in L3 hospitals. This is an extremely underserved market with c.1/3 patients on the 
waiting list. But tiered healthcare has constrained the expansion of L3 hospitals” (Deputy 
president L3 hospital). Moreover, the pricing structure of L3 hospitals varies across the 
population, normally requiring a higher relative share to be paid by the patient and a higher total 
cost incurred—between 11% and 14% variation between L1 and L3 hospitals across different 
geographical markets. However, recent government reforms caused some patients to be 
redirected to smaller hospitals and the private sector creating space for resource partitioning in 
the market, and increasing ambiguity for new entrants, as treatment standards were vaguely 
defined and clinic licencing procedures were opaque: “There are also provincial and city-level 
requirements that are not always specified in publicly available sources” (SVP). 
Acquiring a distributor would help address this opportunity through the new PPT+ BM 
allowing coherence with OneHealth’s global BM on two levels. First, it responds to OneHealth’s 
value capture policy. As the SVP noted, although “the board of directors says, ‘We must earn 
profits within six years’, we can actually offer a profitable business from day one” (SVP). Given 
the local conditions, the PPT+ model was designed to augment OneHealth’s value capture policy 
(i.e. reimbursement system) as it was well entrenched in a province where the reimbursement 
levels were “in acceptable levels with the policy”. Second, the PPT+ model is scalable and can be 
used as a platform for expansion, thereby restoring OneHealth’s international high growth plans. 
However, the PPT+ model challenged the global BM in two respects: 
Augmenting service integration. To be able to compete in China, the PPT+ model required a 




upstream service integration inherent in the global BM, with the distributor’s contracts. The 
contracts were used as levers to augment their old clinic operations model to be exclusively based 
on medical care. The PPT+ model was based on “converting the existing hospital contracts from 
products and some limited service elements into full-fledged medical service management 
contracts” (SVP). The PPT+ model further implied using an existing product distribution 
platform with weak coherence with both the existing resource base and the global BM for 
developing a fully integrated dialysis product offering and treatment service. Because the original 
PPT model was to a large extent based on product distribution to hospitals, OneHealth used the 
PPT+ model to leverage the distributor’s relational position in some regions in China. The 
relations were important as they provided opportunities to establish a strong coherence with local 
medical standards using the materials sold to hospitals as a learning and influencing platform. In 
this way the practices carried out by medical technology salespeople helped accessing medical 
care practices. 
Hence the PPT+ model coupled high concentration of resources, residing mainly in L3 
hospitals, with strongly coherent resources at the fringes of Chinese hospitals’ medical practices. 
Specifically, the PPT+ model enabled access to medical care via two legally separated units 
supplying a whole range of medical services, clinic management, machinery and consumables to 
local hospitals. As noted by the SVP, “in other countries OneHealth is a clean clinic operator. 
But, in this case we invest in the owners of the existing supply company who have very well-
established contacts with authorities and hospitals; thus, we consider it a very good platform to 
build clinics on”. Even though the PPT+ model threatened the global BM, as emphasised by the 
SVP: “We haven’t done this anywhere else in the world. We are a total service provider now and 
we’ve never bothered about selling products, only buying them…”, the PPT+ model also 




Refitting technological nesting. OneHealth’s global BM competes on the supply side variable of 
its medical quality benchmarking system: “It’s actually our medical quality benchmarking between 
clinics within and between clinics in OneHealth and the rest of the private/public sector and 
patient satisfaction we [compete on]” (SVP). However, markets are characterised by “Healthcare 
providers, public as well as private are very reluctant at sharing medical outcomes… and because 
different actors can choose to measure certain aspects and not others or measure certain aspects 
in slightly different ways, results are difficult to compare on an apple-by-apple basis” (SVP). This 
creates information asymmetries in the market which OneHealth can use to its advantage, as a 
measure of value creation, which aligns with its value-based pricing model that the CEO and 
President see as a future model of pricing medical services. However, in China reimbursement 
levels vary across different regions and hospitals making patients liable to a co-payment 
agreement where the cost of care is split between patients and the health insurance system. Thus, 
the value-based pricing model underpinning the global BM needed refitting in the PPT+ model. 
Specifically, value-based pricing in the global BM was contingent on (1) rigorous, 
internationally standardized and institutionalized measurement standards, (2) that treatments were 
measured systematically, and (3) continuous improvements in the quality of care could be proven, 
and (4) eventually normalized at validated and accepted level of medical quality in a short time 
span. However, the PPT+ model incorporated a value capture model where legitimacy was based 
on (a) trusted medical equipment (machinery and disposables) expertise and (b) clinic business 
and managerial expertise, and (c) a “proof-of-concept” drawn from OneHealth’s “international 
success stories”. Hence, rather than garnering more value from upstream value creating activities 
by adjusting backstream activities (a strategic position refined in the global BM), the PPT+ model 
was refitted such that it created even stronger coherence with the entire value chain. In this way, 
the PPT+ model leveraged on the concentration of medical technology at the core of the 




The BM innovation of PPT+ shows that an ambiguous regulatory framework and opaque 
local standards will lead local managers to take advantage of resources that are loosely coupled 
with the organization’s core business but strongly coherent with local resources which maybe 
relatively novel and peripheral in the resource space. This leads us to our third proposition 
suggesting that contextual conditions underpinning resource partitioning may drive MNCs’ local 
BM innovation: 
Proposition 3: When specific industries in transforming economies are characterized by resource 
partitioning, BMI practice will be strongly coherent with local demands but loosely coupled with global 
BM practice. 
Resource Orchestration (Quadrant 4) 
OneHealth’s China operations had quickly moved from a failed single BM operation to a 
multidextrous BM configuration of running several BMs in parallel. Although the global BM was 
built on the idea of global integration, OneHealth had a resource and capability base sufficient to 
address the local Chinese conditions. To make use of such resource slack, OneHealth 
recombined its flexible managerial structure in China to better orchestrate the resources between 
the weakly coherent units residing in the new BMs (see above) with the global BM. For the sake 
of simplicity, we term this model PPT++. This was enabled by combined investments in the 
distributor and managerial abilities to shift and balance between different duties and areas of 
expertise. Each manager was multi-competent with several years of experience and could 
therefore see the needs and challenges of local responsiveness. The PPT++ model was devised 
to orchestrate this resource and asset base by combining elements of the three BM models to 
create a unique model. To be able to access local licenses and speed up market entry, both 
dominant aspects of the global BM—ownership and service integration—were adapted. 
Distributing ownership. A positive outcome of the failed initial JV was that a new senior 




spotted doctors who had considered running their own clinics but had little resources and other 
expertise. While the global BM was strict on its ownership policy, the PPT++ model 
reconsidered this by setting up an individual partnership program with doctors and other medical 
experts who were both recognized for their expertise and had an entrepreneurial drive to 
“operate a professional clinic according to international standards”. The program was initially 
rolled out in some select regions and quickly gained traction among local medical entrepreneurs. 
The individual entrepreneurs would not only help realize OneHealth’s plans for China by 
opening new clinics but were also important for gaining necessary contacts with local authorities. 
As the SVP explained, “The rules in China are very opaque. That’s why we try to work with this 
local partner by acquiring part of the company. Because they have already received licenses, then 
it must somehow indicate that they… have a relationship [with local health authorities] needed to 
acquire licenses for operating clinics.” While beneficial indeed, this was only a liminal stage in 
establishing a more large-scale acquisition and greenfield operation. Partnering with these local 
doctors also helped creating further links with local medical service suppliers with whom the 
doctors had been dealing in their previous positions at the hospitals. 
Retrofitting service integration. Well aware that “the alignment of operating requirements to a 
common standard nationally should simplify OneHealth’s management”, SVP retrofitted the so 
called “platform acquisition” model upon which the global BM had operated. The new model 
implied that the acquired product distributor would be used as a “base for accelerated clinic 
development” (SVP). PPT++ was built on a reversed ‘value extension’ model, that is, using the 
localised value generation model (i.e. product distribution) as a vehicle to its global service 
delivery model rather than the other way around.   
The distributor’s close relationships with the local hospitals further provided access to 
recruiting professional medical staff needed to run the new clinics, “We also have an advantage in 




on their close relationships with the hospitals as a total service provider” (SVP). These 
management contracts were used such that the partner owned the clinic license, but OneHealth 
controls the management and de facto operates the clinic. “The key benefit here is that we don’t 
need to worry about a clinic relicensing, but on the other hand we are in a weaker position as we 
are not the license holder.”  Further, the PPT++ model positioned them as a reliable total 
solutions provider rather than a medical care provider, advantaging them over others to be 
granted new licenses to open more clinics and reapprovement of existing licenses.  
In addition, the PPT++ model expanded vertically. For example, shortly after the PPT+ 
model was launched, OneHealth acquired a clinic in Hong Kong to “benefit from the CEPA 
[Close Economic Partnership Agreement] rules for 100% investments in mainland China” (SVP). 
Using the regulatory framework, OneHealth used the acquisition for entry and further clinic 
acquisitions in Mainland China. In this way, the PPT++ model was designed to orchestrate its 
local distributor networks, local doctors and the Hong Kong based partner to acquire another 
distribution company with hospital contracts in two provinces in China. Using these distributors 
helped processing clinic license applications at a larger scale. As reported recently, “26 
independent clinic license applications are being progressed [in various regions] with the minority 
holder [HK partner]” (SVP). The PPT++ model was devised such that OneHealth could use 
these relationships to make joint clinic license applications, “As part of this set-up, we have 
handed in a number of joint clinic applications (greenfield investments), of which 4 already 
approved by the MoH, with the first clinic starting construction in December [2018]” (SVP). 
In transforming economies where regulatory frameworks inhibit tight coupling between 
MNCs’ global resources and local assets, localised BMIs will take advantage of slack resources 
and orchestrate them in novel ways to effectively respond to local needs. In the case of PPT++ 
OneHealth was able to loosen its ownership regime to better orchestrate localised assets by 




value capture. Also, localised BMs could retrofit existing service integration practices through 
alternative value generating activities as vehicles for value extension. These show that novel 
attributes and efficiency seeking can be orchestrated effectively to achieve local responsiveness 
even though this means weak coherence with global BM practices. This leads us to our fourth 
proposition: 
Proposition 4: When transforming economies have restrictive regulatory frameworks of foreign 
ownership of local assets, new BMs will be developed around resource orchestration of assets that are 
strongly coupled locally and weakly coherent with global BM practice. 
DISCUSSION: TOWARDS A MULTIDEXTROUS VIEW OF BMI 
We introduced the concept of multidexterity to explain an organization’s capability to develop 
and maintain multiple BMs simultaneously to be able to respond to institutional and 
organisational dynamics. This implies being able to keep “one hand for the globally consistent 
umbrella model and one for each local adaptation” (Tallman et al., 2018: 518-519, emphasis added). 
Hence, multidexterity embraces the inclusion of multiple models and is neither a version of 
“dexterity”; a single BM capability or skilfulness (Autio et al., 2011), or “ambidexterity”; dual BMs 
that are dichotomous or orthogonal (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Multidexterity, we argue, is not 
only conceptually different, but seems to be a “defining characteristic of the 21st century 
enterprise” (Grant, 2008: 479). Yet, the concept is “notably overlooked and underutilized” (Ritter 
& Geersbro, 2018: 75) in management research. However, our findings reveal several important 
conceptual characteristics that extend and substantiate the concept of multidexterity. 
First, our case shows that global BMs are contingent on unambiguous regulatory 
frameworks and industry standards, and resource integration regimes serve as important 
boundary conditions for multidexterity. For OneHealth these conditions were met in Saudi 
Arabia, but in Turkey and the first attempt to enter China failed due to ambiguous regulatory 
frameworks and unclear industry standards. These findings are important contingencies for the 




integral in global BMs (Snihur & Tarzijan, 2018). These conditions suggest that MNCs will be 
reluctant to disrupt global BM structures (Tallman et al., 2018) and engage in BMI beyond the 
existing strategic agenda of the MNC (Adner & Levinthal, 2008). 
Second, MNCs operating in transitioning economies are commonly inclined to arbitrate 
their original full-ownership regime (Luo, 2001) for more favourable regimes in the transitioning 
context (Witt & Lewin, 2007). To be able to maintain local BMs alongside global BMs, MNCs are 
likely to give up certain products and service practices when entering transitioning markets 
(Ghemawat, 2007). From the view of multidexterity, these are necessary but insufficient 
conditions for maintaining the global BM while developing local BMs. Our findings revealed that, 
only when the transitioning economy has unfavourable institutional frameworks for MNCs’ 
global BMs, will they consider arbitrating components of the global BM. However, this is only a 
viable option when the industrial and technological standards offer an opportunity to act 
entrepreneurially despite being inconsistent with the firm’s BM (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
Managers will under such conditions engage in skunkworks to arbitrate the MNC’s organisational 
and strategic context (Burgelman, 1983) by developing new performance regimes (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2008). Our findings show that MNCs in transforming economies can do so by taking 
advantage of loosely coupled resources and weakly coherent practices, such as the use of informal 
ties (Martin, 2014) and open strategy network (Hautz et al., 2017) in pursuit of localised BMs. In 
this way, skunkworks offers a distinctive practice space within multidextrous BMI by means of 
accommodating several types of resource and practice couplings simultaneously (Orton & Weick, 
1990) despite the unique configuration of the global BM. 
Third, transforming economies characterized by dense concentration of large generalised 
local incumbent actors leave underutilised resources to be soaked up by entrant firms. Under 
such conditions, entrant firms are inclined to take advantage of resource partitioning (Carroll et 




with the global BM of the MNC, the multidextrous approach suggests that resource 
commitments can be made by using existing ownership regimes, thereby remaining strongly 
coherent with global BM practice. Our findings, demonstrate that some degree of supply chain 
integration (e.g., acquiring distributor) can help developing local BM by taking advantage of 
underutilised resources in the market and by loosening the coupling between the MNCs service 
and technology regimes from the global BM. This finding suggests that multidexterity, as 
opposed to other lenses, can help firms responding to market complexities by enacting BM 
practices that are variably interconnected in bundles of practices (Schatzki, 2016). In this way, the 
multidextrous framework offers a conceptual apparatus to better understand how resource 
partitioning can help bridging micro, meso and macro level contingencies in BMI in transforming 
economies. 
Fourth, a common challenge of MNCs is to adequately orchestrate their resources when 
the distance (e.g., institutional, cultural, economic) between the home and host country increases 
(Verbeke & Kano, 2016). Our findings substantiate and extend this conceptual argument, 
suggesting that multidextrous BMI is a distinctive practice, which can orchestrate both 
distributed ownership of local assets and retrofitting the global BM’s service regime by taking 
advantage of local resources. This is an extension of the BMI literature, which suggests that 
resource orchestration can be achieved by technology integration and managerial industry 
experience (Frankenberger & Stam, 2020). We further argue that from a multidexterity 
perspective, resource orchestration may gradually extend the overall scope of the global BM and 
different local BMs to maintain a minimum degree of fitness between the firm’s technology 
regime with the external environment (Helfat et al., 2007). Such coherence includes, but is not 
limited to alignment with emerging industry standards (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009) but also to 
the regulatory framework of local host markets. Our findings show that local managers’ specialist 




fit emergent service requirements in the market. These findings suggest that MNCs enacting 
multidextrous BMI can use resource orchestration when (i) resources are available and adaptable 
to new local BMs and (ii) the local organisation has a coordination flexibility to adopt those 
resources (Sanchez, 1995). 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to contribute to the limited understanding of development and 
enactment of multiple BMs by Western MNCs in transforming economies. We proposed the 
concept of multidexterity as a viable way to account for institutional and organisational dynamics 
in BMI. In doing so, we contribute in several ways to the emergent literature on BMI in general 
(Foss & Saebi, 2017, 2018) and in transforming economies, in particular (Tallman et al., 2018). 
We reveal how MNCs develop and combine competing BMs in transforming economies 
depending on the extent to which regulatory frameworks and industry standards are ambiguous 
or opaque. We propose the concept of multidexterity as a response to the limitations of extant 
literature on BMI in explaining the underpinning mechanism by which firms can simultaneously 
deploy multiple conflicting BMs during market entry. We found that institutional contingencies 
play a major role for which strategies MNCs can adopt in developing local BMs. Through our 
conceptualisation of multidexterity, we outline some conditions that may affect different types of 
BMI practices. Accounting for the extent to which institutional contingencies pose challenges to 
global BMs, we proposed a typology that shows that BMI practices involve skunkworks, resource 
partitioning and resource orchestration, that take advantage of resources, assets and capabilities 
that are variably coupled and coherent with global BMs.  
There are benefits in considering multidextrous BMs as a way of better fitting a complex 
changing context. In large complex transforming countries such as China, it is highly unlikely that 
one solution will work in all regions and areas (Verbeke & Kano, 2016). A multidextrous 




meso and macro level phenomena. Our findings have shown that activities that constitute a BM’s 
‘value system’ are interdependent with multiple actors’ activities at the individual level (e.g., 
individual managers), group level (e.g., clinics), organizational level (e.g., distributors, hospitals) 
and institutional level (e.g., regulations and standards). However, the number and strength of 
these interdependencies can vary from activity to activity and may change over time causing 
interdependencies to emerge, change, or dissolve as a result of corporate entrepreneurial 
activities. This suggests that couplings within and between bundles of practices and systems are 
dynamic and may be both adaptive and maladaptive at different times (Glassman, 1973). These 
characteristics suggest that multidextrous BMI practices compound such that they present 
themselves as dynamic activity bundles (Demir, 2015).  
This is not to underestimate the complexity involved in the tensions that may arise within 
such a practice bundle. Therefore, internal costs arising from duplication of effort and complexity 
and benefits such as innovation, should be weighed up against benefits in the market where a 
multidextrous approach may more closely fit with variations in customer demands. This may 
raise new ways of thinking about multidexterity in terms of appreciating the complexity of 
coordinating structures and roles that allow organizations to orchestrate resources in order to 
retain flexibility and responsiveness between global, regional and local BMs (Verbeke & Kano, 
2016). MNCs may find multidexterity a useful concept for considering cross border market entry 
strategies in transforming economies where simultaneous multiple BMs may be an effective 
hedge against uncertainty when overall benefits are anticipated to be substantial. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: The multidextrous space 
 
 




BMI Practice Driver Explanation Representative evidence 
        
2007 Sweden N N Divestiture Non-core 
business 
Gambro Healthcare was divested in June 2007 to funds 
managed by Bridgepoint. 




N N Joint Venture Growth and 
Operational 
efficiency 
JV agreement with a Saudi Arabian Holding Company 
with major investments in the medical sector including 
Bupa Arabia. 
“aligning operational efficiency and highest medical quality... The knowhow of 
providing three million treatments to our 19,000 patients goes into every single 
medical activity.” (CEO, President) 
2013 Italy N N Acquisition Deregulation 
and 
privatization 
Management and care of chronic diseases is experiencing 
a trend for privatization as private providers are expected 
to deliver high quality care at a competing price. 
“Our aim in Sicily is now to significantly enhance medical outcomes and 
operational efficiency in these new centres by quickly integrating them to the 
OneHealth model.” (CEO, President) 
2013 Multiple N N Exploitation Growth and 
profitability 
OneHealth receives the “[University] Healthcare BM” 
award. 
“Healthcare is clearly in transition. This creates both challenges and 
opportunities. With its innovative approach to the future of the dialysis industry, 
OneHealth has successfully made its mark” (Stephen Chick, INSEAD) 
2014 China N N Exploitation Deregulation 
and 
privatization 
The 12th Five-Year Plan of Chinese Healthcare Reform 
states that the government will further optimize 
healthcare resources allocation and encourage the 
establishment of private medical institutions. 
“Reform of China’s healthcare system to control cost growth for payers and 
patients, while still improving quality, is a priority” (SVP) 
2015 Multiple Y Y Exploration Consolidation of 
distributed 
expertise 
OneHealth launches its e-learning platform Medicate to 
couple its research activities with its medical quality 
system. 
“As a product-independent provider, our staff is our key asset. Providing the best 
education to them as well as to our patients, nurses and management will further 
improve the quality of life of our patients” (Chief Medical Officer) 
 
2016 China N N JV Market entry 
barrier 
Entry criteria 70/30 partnership with local firm, hence JV 
with Chinese state-owned conglomerate YG 
“The plan is to establish a nationwide network of dialysis centres that fill the 
current supply and quality gap in China… The JV partnership aims to provide 
patients with Swedish and European high standards of renal care that is covered 
by Chinese public reimbursement schemes to make the service affordable.” 
(Legal Adviser) 
2016 Turkey Y N Divestiture BM failure Ambiguous industry standards, highly deregulated 
market with low entry barriers. 
“The market was just too chaotic, anyone could enter and run a clinic as they 
wish, standards were too poor, and doctors could easily buy themselves licences 
and customers.” (SVP) 
2017 China Y N Divestiture BM failure BM decoupled from ordinary system and no coherence 
with ordinary BM logic. 
“Already after 6 months OneHealth requested for the JV to be terminated due to 
misaligned views on how to manage and operate the JV” (SVP) 
2017 China Y Y Multidexterity Profit pressure 
from owners 
Following the Chinese JV failure in 2016, the owners 
wanted to see their investment loss being corrected 
a.s.a.p. 
“The current owners (Bridgepoint) are… anxious to get a “proof point” of China 
actually breaking even, which is the reason we have adopted a somewhat 
unorthodox approach to go for both PPT platforms and independent clinic 






Table 2: Multidextrous BMI in transforming economies 
Dominant practice Resource Integration Skunkworks Resource Partitioning Resource Orchestration 
 
     
BM Global BM1 Local BM2 (PPT) Local BM3 (PPT+) Local BM4 (PPT++) 
 
Type of market* Developing-Developed Transitioning-Developing Transitioning-Developing Transitioning-Developing 
 
Type of regulatory regime Centralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized 
 
Local industry standards ambiguity  
 
Low Moderate-High Opaque Moderate-High 
Level of resource coupling Moderate Loose Loose Tight 
 
Degree of structural coherence Moderate Weak Strong Weak 
 
BM localisation Moderate High High Moderate 
 
Main objective Speeding up multinationalisation Developing new performance metrics Leveraging local regulations Leveraging slack resources 
 
Mechanisms Resource ownership; Service 
integration; Technological nesting 
Service disintegration; Decoupling 
ownership 
Service augmentation; Technology 
refitting 
Distributing ownership; Service 
retrofitting 
 
BM adaptation/adoption Localisation of global BM through minor 
adaptations 
- Disintegrating service integration 
- Decoupling ownership 
- Augmenting service integration 
- Refitting technological nesting 
- Distributing ownership 
- Retrofitting service integration 
 
Representative example Saudi Arabia: “OneHealth will also 
continue to invest in localising the renal 
care service by training Saudi Arabian 
nurses in the field of dialysis through its 
Medicate in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.” 
(Press release, Jan 2019) 
China: “It’s an unconventional model 
that does not fit the rest. It will remain 
a rather separate business until its 
success can be proven.” (SVP) 
China: Platform acquisitions of product 
distribution firms serve as vehicles for 
clinic greenfield operations. In this way, 
OneHealth partitions the market locally 
by finding a niche that is poorly 
addressed by the significantly larger 
international competitors. 
 
China: “We have received board 
approval for a similar (but smaller) 
acquisition in [City], starting due 
diligence next week; in parallel we are 
already applying for clinic licenses in 
certain surrounding locations” (SVP) 
 * Based on UN/WESP 2019 Country classification 
 
